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ABSTRACT. Via an examination of the Labour party's approach to by-election campaigning 
in Scotland between the fall of the first Labour administration in October 1924 and the 
party’s return to office in May 1929, this article explores the changing horizons of British 
radicalism in an era of mass democracy. While traditional depictions of inter-war politics as 
a two-party contest in which political allegiances were shaped primarily by social class have 
increasingly been questioned, accounts of Labour politics in this period have focussed chiefly 
on national responses to the challenges posed by the expanded franchise. In contrast, this 
article considers local experiences, as provincial participation and autonomy, particularly in 
candidate selection and electioneering, came to be viewed as an impediment to wider 
electoral success, and political debate coalesced around attempts to speak for a political 
nation that was, as the focus on Scotland reveals, indisputably British. Often portrayed as 
evidence of ideological divisions, such internal quarrels had crucial spatial features, and 
reflected a conflict between two models of political identity and participation: one 
oppositional in outlook, local in loyalty, and rooted in the radical tradition, the other focused 
upon electoral concerns and Labour’s national standing. 
 
As the 1929 general election campaign began, the national election agents of the 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties together instructed their candidates to neither 
answer questionnaires nor meet delegations from organized lobbying groups. Eyeing this 
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outbreak of political harmony with suspicion, The Manchester Guardian’s political 
correspondent conceded that the arrangement was partly warranted, especially when such 
intrusions formed part of an orchestrated campaign. Nevertheless, some wry counsel was 
offered: ‘as every political student knows’, it was advised, ‘when all three parties are agreed 
there is something wrong’; in this instance, the dubious spur to unanimity was a shared terror 
‘of anything that will break the hold of the party machine on their candidates’. Unchecked 
local responses raised the disquieting prospect of ‘answers and pledges’ being issued that 
were not ‘strictly within the programme of the party machine’.1 
Such disparagement of ‘machine’ politics was, perhaps, facetious, the cross-party 
agreement no more than a pragmatic response to the challenges of communicating with an 
electorate now four times the size it had been in 1910. In this context, greater central control 
of election campaigns was doubtless unavoidable, as all parties strove, understandably, to 
maximize the reach and influence of their propaganda.2 Yet the incident was also suggestive 
of deeper shifts. The consequences of the creation of an enlarged national electorate went 
beyond mere questions of scale, or the adoption of more efficient methods of political 
communication. In tandem with the fears provoked by domestic social and industrial unrest 
and the rise of extremism in Europe, which together encouraged a more circumspect political 
mood, the advent of mass democracy served to increase the prestige of the dispassionate 
individual elector.3 By the close of the 1920s, a broad consensus regarding acceptable 
political conduct and rhetoric had been established, marginalizing sectional, divisive voices, 
and limiting electoral engagement to the casting of the ballot. Popular traditions of rallies, 
deputations and petitions, which, in offering those beyond the franchise a means of 
expression, had been central to the oppositional temper of provincial radicalism, were side-
lined, tarred as the methods of extremists, and identified with the activities of the Communist 
party of Great Britain (CPGB).4 
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This article explores the emergence of this restrained national political atmosphere via 
a study of Labour’s approach to by-election campaigning in Scotland between the fall of the 
first Labour administration in October 1924, and the party’s return to office in May 1929 (see 
table 1, below). This geographical focus illuminates the degree to which, rather than a two-
party contest defined by social class, inter-war politics became a question of competing 
visions of a British nation.5 In emphasizing Labour’s abandonment of overt appeals to class 
in this period, this study affirms the recent research of Jon Lawrence and Laura Beers, who 
have traced Labour’s response to the altered post-war political landscape.6 Likewise, the 
analysis presented here is sympathetic towards Richard Toye’s recent criticism of those who 
would depict inter-war Labour politics as determined by a division between a constitutionalist 
right and a disillusioned left enamoured of extra-parliamentary action. As Toye suggests, a 
range of views regarding the purpose of parliament existed, from a forum for debate to a tool 
for implementing policy.7  
Nevertheless, even such nuanced accounts are concerned chiefly with the differing 
attitudes present within the parliamentary Labour party (PLP). By detailing the impact of 
franchise reform upon radical conceptions of political representation at a provincial level, this 
study augments existing accounts of the reshaping of British politics after 1918. Working-
class representatives had hitherto been lauded as local tribunes, sent to parliament to oppose 
privilege and corruption, a belief that reached its apogee in Scotland in 1922, when the 
victorious Clydeside Independent Labour party (ILP) candidates, and Edwin Scrymgeour, the 
radical Prohibitionist elected in Dundee, left Glasgow for London amid euphoric scenes.8 In 
this essentially antagonistic view of politics, parliament was enemy territory, and elections a 
chance to convey to the political establishment the extent of popular discontent. Such an 
ethos was, however, weakened by Labour’s proximity to national office after 1922, and 
would prove incompatible with the constraints of national electioneering. What could appear 
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as an ideological division between left and right developed crucial spatial features, and is best 
understood as a conflict between two modes of political identity, participation and practice: 
one oppositional in outlook, local in loyalty, and rooted in the radical tradition, the other 
focused upon Labour’s national standing. At the heart of this dispute were the questions of 
how, upon whose behalf, and to what end, Labour should approach elections. 
After 1924, those sceptical of the value of national politics saw their influence wane, 
as local autonomy, particularly in candidate selection, came to be regarded as a barrier to 
electoral success. This was, as historians have recognized, partly a response to the lurid 
propaganda issued by the party’s opponents, which depicted Labour as beholden to the 
aggressive masculinity, narrow sectionalism, and incipient Bolshevism of the trades unions, 
and, in consequence, as a threat to constitutional government.9 In response, the Labour party 
moved to proscribe any collaboration between local Labour activists and their Communist 
counterparts. But in meeting the central demand made by radicals for more than a century, 
the mass franchise also rendered national elections the true measure of public opinion, and 
thereby undermined the oppositional basis of British radicalism. If, prior to 1918, Labour 
could claim to speak in part for that productive section of the populace excluded from the 
constitution, a decade later such a stance was untenable. As the party’s 1928 programme, 
Labour and the nation, declared, Labour spoke ‘not as the agent of this class or that’, but as 
the ‘trustee’ of the nation.10 Rather than a struggle between rival sections of society, British 
politics became a means of divining the collective will of some thirty million individual 
electors, who, whatever the social and economic tensions, were electoral equals. In such a 
climate, disparate sectional and regional outlooks were difficult to accommodate.11 
The tensions which arose between provincial traditions of radicalism and national 
understandings of politics were especially conspicuous at by-elections. Such contests had 
long provided a setting for the interplay of local and national issues, particularly those held 
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under the rule requiring appointees to ministerial office to renew their electoral mandate.12 
However, by the early twentieth century all by-elections had assumed a similar status, and 
served as a gauge of national fortunes between general elections; significantly, ministerial by-
elections disappeared in 1926.13 After 1924, by-elections were thus central to Labour’s 
strategy for electoral recovery, with the national leadership viewing them as ‘contests … of 
vital importance’.14 Drawing on the records of the Labour party, election literature, the local 
and national press, and unpublished testimony, the changing use of the platform offered by 
such contests is delineated, as Labour candidates came to be selected with the preferences of 
a national audience in mind, and their rhetoric crafted accordingly. The analysis is necessarily 
chronological: the contests of 1924 and 1925 are assessed first; there follows a brief account 
of the by-elections held in early 1926; the course of Labour’s electioneering between 1927 
and 1929 is then charted. Lastly, the wider implications of this study for the historiography of 
inter-war politics are considered, as political debate coalesced around attempts to speak for a 
single political nation that was, as a focus on Scotland reveals, unquestionably British, and 
Labour traded the confrontational worldview of local activists for a broad appeal that 
positioned the party as an alternative national government. The belief that politics was a 
forum in which divergent classes, sections and local interests competed was relegated to the 
fringes of British politics. In its place arrived a conviction that an all-embracing national 
appeal, one capable of reflecting the extent to which the categories of people, public and 
electorate were now synonymous, was not only possible, but commendable too.
 
I 
In November 1924 some 3,000 mourners assembled in Dundee’s Caird Hall to honour 
Edmund Morel, a prominent anti-imperialist and pacifist, and Labour member for the city 
since 1922, who died just two weeks after victory at the 1924 general election.15 That contest 
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had been waged by the Conservatives on the question of Labour’s alleged sympathies with 
Bolshevism. Key was the assertion that the conduct of the Labour campaign, and especially 
the disruption of Liberal and Conservative meetings by Labour supporters, laid bare the 
latter’s divisive credo and extreme methods; only the Conservatives, it was claimed, were 
capable of governing in the interests of the nation.16 Although Labour’s share of the national 
vote increased, the purported links between Labour and the Communist party inspired 
sufficient numbers into the Conservative fold to deny Labour office. The apparent division of 
electoral politics on the question of class versus nation, to Labour’s detriment, reinforced the 
desire of the party leadership to display their commitment to the constitution, and reject a 
narrow class appeal.17 Indeed, the result confirmed the trend witnessed at the May 1924 
Glasgow Kelvingrove by-election, where the divisional Labour party (DLP) had once more 
selected the openly Communist Aitken Ferguson as their candidate. With deep misgivings, 
but anxious to avert a dispute with local activists, the National executive committee (NEC) 
had sanctioned the candidacy. The result, which Egerton Wake, Labour’s national election 
agent, viewed as ‘peculiarly significant’, was stagnation in the Labour vote, and the capture 
by the Unionist nominee, the future Secretary of State for Scotland Walter Elliot, of two-
thirds of the votes polled by the Liberals the previous year; the Unionist share of the vote rose 
from 43 to 55 per cent, while Liberal support slumped from 18 to 5 per cent.18 The debacle in 
Kelvingrove compelled the NEC to at last bar individual Communists from standing as 
Labour candidates, as the importance of projecting a coherent political message became 
evident.19 Labour must, the executive asserted, ‘be in a position to guarantee that its 
Candidates – those who stand publicly for our policy … support that policy 
wholeheartedly’.20  
Thus when Morel’s passing occasioned the first by-election of the new parliament, the 
NEC was less inclined to permit the kind of aggressive local campaign that would result in a 
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similarly polarized contest. The Labour nomination was received by Thomas Johnston, 
defeated in Stirling and West Clackmannanshire at the general election. Editor of Forward, 
newspaper of the ILP in the west of Scotland, and author of the 1909 denunciation of the 
Scottish aristocracy Our Scots noble families, Johnston superficially shared the radical 
concerns of the Clydeside ILP members.21 By 1924, however, convinced that lasting social 
reform could only be attained via the institutions of the state, Johnston had begun to distance 
himself from issues such as temperance and Scottish home rule, and now advocated imperial 
development as the surest path to socialism. The NEC eagerly promoted his candidature 
ahead of nominees from the local Labour movement.22  
The campaign in Kelvingrove had been condemned by Patrick Dollan, an ILP 
councillor in Glasgow, as ‘a burlesque of electioneering’, crowned by an ‘unconstitutional’ 
election address.23 Johnston adopted a different approach, stressing the local benefits of 
Labour’s national programme as he confidently rebutted the claims of his Liberal opponent 
Ernest Simon that he and his party fomented class hatred. His moderation was praised by The 
Times, although it noted, with a suggestion of disappointment, the low-key nature of the 
contest in a city notorious for boisterous elections.24 Yet Johnston purposely fostered this 
subdued tone during his successful campaign: when he and Simon inadvertently arrived 
together at a local shipyard to address the workforce, the scheduling conflict was resolved by 
the toss of a coin, and, in place of the traditional vote of confidence from the audience, 
Johnston requested that a vote of thanks be offered to both speakers.25  
Nonetheless, the contest in Dundee was part of a process that remained inchoate. If, 
by 1924, the NEC was increasingly convinced that the old ways of campaigning and local 
sovereignty in candidate selection were untenable, then not all candidates and activists 
concurred. The ensuing tensions were notably acute in rural and suburban constituencies, 
which, as Clare Griffiths has demonstrated, assumed a growing importance in Labour 
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thinking in the 1920s, as it became obvious that the formation of a parliamentary majority 
required the party to appeal outwith its industrial strongholds.26 Appraising the 1924 general 
election results, Egerton Wake noted that Labour had outpolled the Conservatives throughout 
Wales and in the Scottish burghs, and had been only narrowly defeated in urban England: it 
was in the counties where Labour’s ‘future problem[s]’ lay.27  
Still, the desire to conquer the countryside was about more than parliamentary 
arithmetic: as Griffiths suggests, it was a means of enhancing Labour’s status as a party able 
to represent ‘more than sectional interests [and] equipped to deal with the full range of 
national policy’.28  Vital to this was the establishment of a central by-election fund in early 
1925 through which campaigns in areas without an established Labour party infrastructure 
could be subsidized.29 While Labour was never successful in terms of securing rural 
parliamentary seats beyond the mining counties, this remained an organizational innovation 
with significant consequences for the way in which the party campaigned, and for the 
message its candidates conveyed.30 At a basic level, the concerns and practices of urban 
radicalism had less traction in rural Britain; further, as politics came to be conducted for the 
benefit of a national electorate, however illusory, concern grew that combative campaigns in 
urban areas would be reported further afield, to an audience who identified such popular 
traditions with an acrimonious class politics. We should therefore treat with care accounts of 
the inter-war period that distinguish too sharply between urban and rural politics; with central 
funding came central control, and the institution of a style and message suited to both.31 Yet 
nor should we set up an unqualified opposition between local and national politics: the 
change was more intricate than that. By the mid-1920s a profound shift was underway in the 
assumptions that underpinned radical politics, especially with regards to the perceived site 
and purpose of elections. The boundary between local and national politics was blurred, and 
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by-elections became an arena in which an ongoing national political contest could be 
temporarily fought. 
The initially uneven nature of this process was clear at the Ayr Burghs by-election of 
June 1925. The Labour candidate was Patrick Dollan, who, despite his earlier criticism of the 
Kelvingrove campaign, refused to temper the more strident rhetorical and electoral traditions 
of west central Scotland in a constituency that had been Unionist since 1906. Announcing 
himself to be a working-class candidate opposed to the current social order, Dollan demanded 
home rule for Scotland, and proclaimed ‘landlordism’ and ‘capitalism’ to be the chief evils 
facing society; his election address carried a quotation from Robert Burns’ ode to 
egalitarianism, ‘A Man’s a Man for A’ That’.32 Dollan and his supporters cleaved to the 
aggressive traditions of popular politics, arranging a flurry of outdoor meetings and rallies at 
which Labour’s message could be publicly proclaimed. Labour speakers declined to adopt an 
emollient tone. When the Liberal candidate dismissed Dollan and his ILP colleagues as the 
‘Clyde variety troupe’, Campbell Stephen, MP for Glasgow Camlachie, countered that it was 
better to be a ‘tub-thumper’ than a ‘lick-spittle’.33 The Labour Daily Herald proclaimed 
proudly that Ayr had ‘never before … seen such a campaign’, and the Unionist Glasgow 
Herald was forced to confess that Dollan had campaigned with a fervour ‘rarely equalled in 
modern experience’.34 Even in defeat, Dollan was chaired through the streets, and his 
followers disrupted the victory speech of the Unionist candidate, Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, 
with hoots and catcalls.35  
A similarly contradictory approach was evident five months later in Galloway, in the 
rural south west of Scotland. The decision of the NEC to approve a candidacy in a seat 
Labour had never before contested was reportedly taken only because the ‘dignity’ of 
Labour’s status as the official opposition was felt to hinge upon contesting every by-
election.36 Yet although the contest was one of the first to be financed under the new national 
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by-election scheme, there was an inability (or even refusal) to refine Labour’s message.37 The 
Daily Herald pompously welcomed the contest as an opportunity for Labour to penetrate the 
‘jungles of feudal landlordism’, reflecting the persistence of a division between urban and 
rural politics at odds with the party’s efforts to construct an inclusive national appeal. The 
Labour candidate John Mitchell, a Lanarkshire miner, repeated Dollan’s calls for land reform 
and Scottish home rule. Class also featured: one Labour speaker derided Unionist voters as 
nothing more than craven middle-class ‘snobs’ who ‘admired wealth in others’.38 This 
approach contrasted with the conciliatory message promoted by the victorious Unionist 
nominee Captain Streatfield, who benefitted from the intervention of the Conservative prime 
minister Stanley Baldwin. Alluding to the central issue of the previous general election, 
Baldwin reminded the Galloway electorate of their national duty, asking them not to give 
succour to ‘disruptive forces’; it was, he felt, imperative that ‘the will of the constitutional 
majority [should] prevail’.39  
By late 1925, then, Labour offered the public an ambiguous image. Nationally, the 
party cultivated a restrained tone as it sought to counter Conservative attacks and appear 
capable of governing in the national interest.40 Yet local activists, steeped in the class-based 
culture of trades and labour councils (TLCs), could often persist with a politics of opposition, 
which, in Scotland, rested upon the radical rallying cries of anti-landlordism and temperance, 
and the belief that home rule was necessary to circumvent Westminster’s entrenched 
conservatism.41 Soon, however, this tradition would fade, as electoral failure and the general 
strike encouraged party members to share the verdict of the Glasgow Herald, which, after the 
Galloway contest, announced that voters were ‘tired of declamation and drama in politics’.42 
Local activists duly moved closer to an understanding of politics that prioritized the 
attainment of national office.  
 




In December 1925 David Fleming, Unionist MP for Dunbartonshire and solicitor general in 
the Conservative government, was appointed to the Court of Session; his replacement in 
cabinet was his Unionist colleague in East Renfrewshire, Alexander MacRobert; concurrent 
by-elections were held the following month.43 In East Renfrewshire John Munro, United Free 
Church minister, home rule advocate and James Maxton’s brother-in-law, stood for Labour. 
Munro, whose campaign was bolstered by the presence of leading figures from the ILP left, 
believed that the forceful expression of political conviction would gain public support.44 The 
self-styled ‘fighting parson’, he channelled local discontent, demanding the creation of ‘a 
heaven on earth here and now’. The Daily Herald commended his ‘moral fervour’ and ‘frank 
advocacy of Sermon-on-the-Mount politics’, claiming that the election had ‘assumed the 
character of a religious crusade for social justice’.45 In Dunbartonshire, where the Labour 
nominee William Martin, a Glasgow accountant, was not considered ‘sufficiently 
progressive’ by some, there was still a ‘flood’ of oratory.46  
While the fervent immediacy of such campaigns could rouse local activists to 
impressive feats, any electoral rewards were less obvious. Munro’s radical rhetoric met with 
public indifference; he lamented that his opponents had failed to retaliate in kind after his 
supporters had disrupted Unionist meetings, since he thrived on ‘strong opposition and 
heckling’.47 The Daily Herald began to wonder whether, after the impassioned contests of the 
early 1920s, voters were now ‘tired of elections’.48 Certainly, the political inadequacy of such 
robust tactics was exposed by the setbacks Labour suffered in both contests. Defeat in Ayr 
and Galloway had been expected, and the contests treated accordingly as occasions to 
enhance Labour’s national profile. East Renfrewshire and Dunbartonshire had, in contrast, 
been secured in 1923 in three-cornered contests. In the latter, Martin failed to take advantage 
of the intervention of a rogue ‘Liberal’ candidate.49 Similarly, Munro was unable to increase 
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Labour’s vote in East Renfrewshire when faced solely with Unionist opposition, signalling 
that clamorous appeals to class loyalty only restricted Labour’s constituency.50  
This danger was exacerbated by bellicose local campaigns that disregarded national 
party boundaries, as when Communists openly supported Labour candidates. Alexander 
MacRobert, Unionist candidate in East Renfrewshire, mused upon this distinction between 
local and national politics. While he accepted that the Labour leadership detested their party’s 
‘red section’, MacRobert considered that Munro’s behaviour revealed the continued 
dominance of ‘those who preach … the doctrine of class war and revolution’ within the local 
‘organisation and life of the Socialist party’; in contrast, MacRobert offered policies inspired 
by a ‘spirit of good-will’. This pacific stance was echoed in Dunbartonshire, where the 
Unionist candidate appealed to ‘all moderate and patriotic Electors who desire stable 
government, peace and ordered progress’, and aligned himself with Baldwin’s temperate 
brand of Conservatism, which, he held, had fostered a ‘more friendly and more human spirit 
… in the land’.51 Such rhetoric, which positioned Conservatism as a creed above partisan 
concerns of party or class, aimed at confining Labour to the representation of narrow 
sectional interests. Conservative values, although, of course, deeply political, were expressed 
in near-apolitical terms of stability and moderation, and were designed to be shared by voters 
of all classes.52 This appeal could be highly potent: as a contented Glasgow Herald 
commented, there had not been ‘the slightest indication’ in either constituency that Labour’s 
‘intensive … appeals to class hatred’ had had ‘any real effect on the electors.53 The aversion 
the Labour leadership felt towards divergent local campaigns was thus strengthened by 
electoral results. If Labour wished to return to office a less contentious approach was 
required, and the local radical platform would need to be exchanged for a national 
programme of reform. 
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Crucially, this was true even in Labour’s established heartlands. In Bothwell, situated 
within the Lanarkshire coalfield, the March 1926 by-election was dominated by the looming 
industrial conflict in the mining industry. Yet however strong the temptation to appeal to 
local sentiment, the election was shorn of passion, as the Labour candidate Joseph Sullivan 
pledged blandly to ‘represent every legitimate interest, and to assist all sections of the 
Community without prejudice’.54 Notwithstanding the proximity of Glasgow, the Clydeside 
members were absent. Instead, Sullivan was joined by Arthur Henderson, the Labour party 
secretary, and the PLP leader Ramsay MacDonald, who, The Scotsman protested, had broken 
with political convention by participating in a by-election; for the Daily Herald, in contrast, 
MacDonald’s presence merely emphasized Bothwell’s ‘national importance’, and the extent 
to which by-elections bore wider implications.55 Ernest Young, the Liberal candidate, 
mocked Sullivan for lacking the assured evangelism of earlier generations of socialists.56 
Labour, however, was content to leave such traditions to the CPGB and the ILP: they spoke 
to those already convinced of the need for socialism. The reshaping of Labour’s methods was 
directed at a more expansive audience. 
 
III 
The failure of the May 1926 general strike, and the ensuing defeat of the miners after a six 
month lock-out, is commonly regarded as marking the victory of the constitutional wing of 
the Labour party and the isolation of the radical left, culminating in the eventual disaffiliation 
of the ILP in 1932.57 This is, of course, partly true: although Communist affiliation had been 
rejected and individual Communists nominally prohibited from joining the Labour party prior 
to 1924, it was only after 1926 that these rulings were rigorously enforced, with recalcitrant 
DLPs being reprimanded.58 These actions were mirrored elsewhere within the Labour 
movement: in early 1927 the general council of the Trades Union Congress withdrew 
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recognition from trades and labour councils affiliated to the Communist-aligned National 
Minority Movement (NMM), and abandoned the joint advisory council it had established 
with the National Unemployed Workers’ Committee Movement, a similarly Communist-
inspired body.59 Individual unions took parallel measures against Communist members, 
especially the great amalgamated unions which had emerged during the early 1920s, such as 
the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers, and the Transport and General Workers’ Union.60 It would, however, be mistaken 
to view such developments within a purely ideological framework. The rigorous application 
of the conference rulings was as much a question of ensuring that Labour projected a 
consistent nationwide appeal, and of reconciling conflicting interpretations of where authority 
rested in radical politics, as it was a matter of policy or principle. The pursuit of uniformity 
was intensified by the Communist tendency to revere the local institutions of the Labour 
movement, which were believed to house a vital radicalism as yet untainted by the grubby 
compromises of national politics. In 1927 Harry Pollitt, then head of the NMM but soon to be 
the general secretary of the CPGB, complained that without strong local counterweights to 
central authority, the Labour movement was in danger of becoming ‘a centralised movement 
… like a head without a body’, with trades councils reduced to the status of mere 
‘information and distribution centres’ at the disposal of the centre.61 Similarly, The 
Communist Review railed that ‘the whole weight’ of the Labour party’s ‘bureaucratic 
machine’ was being directed against the ‘active elements in the localities’.62 Both sides, then, 
conflated provincial opposition to central direction, whether industrial or political, with 
Communism, causing the contest on the political left to be viewed through the prism of place. 
After the general strike, Arthur Henderson circulated local Labour parties, restating 
the proscription on cooperating with the CPGB not in terms of philosophy, but with reference 
to geography and hierarchy. Since the exclusion of Communists, there had, he complained, 
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been ‘a steady stream of criticism from certain quarters directed against the National 
executive’. While, he continued, there had ‘never been any doubt at the head office of the 
party’ regarding the dangers of cooperating with the CPGB, matters had ‘not been so clear’ in 
the regions.63 Henderson was plainly ideologically opposed to the CPGB, yet the solution he 
proposed to the problem of Communist interference was an increase in the authority of the 
NEC, which would automatically come at the expense of local independence. Latent between 
1924 and 1926, the ensuing pressures became explicit at the Leith by-election of March 1927. 
The contest stemmed from the decision of Captain Wedgwood Benn, MP for Leith 
since 1918, to resign from the Liberal party and transfer his allegiance to Labour, a 
transformation welcomed at Westminster, where it was taken as confirmation of Labour’s 
position as the only viable opposition to the Conservatives. Philip Snowden, Labour 
chancellor in 1924, informed Benn that his decision had caused ‘genuine rejoicing’ on the 
Labour benches.64 But this enthusiasm was not universal, and in Leith Benn’s conversion 
elicited some scepticism; the local party declined to select him at the ensuing by-election, 
persevering instead with Robert Wilson, Benn’s opponent at the three general elections 
between 1922 and 1924.65 Notwithstanding their history of electoral rivalry, Wilson and Benn 
occupied different political spheres. Wilson, a labour college lecturer, was essentially a local 
candidate: even before the by-election he had reputedly addressed more than 1,000 rallies in 
Leith.66 Conversely, Benn’s focus was Westminster: he visited Leith rarely, confessing 
privately to being ‘rather tired of the sight of the place’.67 Wilson’s appeal embraced a heady 
radicalism: he defended the general strike, and praised those local boards of guardians 
removed by the Conservative government after issuing unauthorized scales of relief to 
striking miners; he then declared his admiration for Soviet Russia, and denounced the British 
empire as an enormous ‘slave plantation’. Though ‘mild-mannered and personally likeable’, 
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he was, The Manchester Guardian concluded, ‘the most unreal politician one has met for a 
considerable period’.68 For Benn, Wilson was simply another ‘rough left-wing believer’.69  
Wilson’s campaign exasperated the Labour leadership, who maintained a studious 
distance from proceedings.70 Surveying the gulf between Wilson’s declarations and Labour’s 
national moderation, the Edinburgh Evening Dispatch surmised he must be a Communist.71 
The assertion was not wholly baseless: Wilson was praised in the Communist press and local 
Communists campaigned on his behalf, reflecting local traditions of cooperation.72 But 
Wilson was not a Communist, and dismissing him as such only masked the central question 
his candidacy raised: were Labour candidates to be conduits for local sentiment, however 
idiosyncratic, or were they advocates of national policy? For the NEC it was plainly the 
latter, and having endured Wilson in anticipation of victory, the triumph of the Liberal 
candidate Ernest Brown by 111 votes was soon attributed to the local refusal to select Benn. 
Egerton Wake stressed Wilson’s failure to appeal beyond the ranks of existing Labour 
supporters, alleging that his belligerent conduct had alienated female voters, and that Benn 
‘would have held the seat for Labour easily’.73 Such criticism was arguably unjust: it was 
only Unionist intervention that allowed Labour to come close to victory; when the Unionists 
stood aside in 1929, the Liberal majority was restored. Nevertheless, Herbert Morrison, the 
leading Labour figure in London, agreed with Wake, stating that Benn would have been ‘an 
almost certainly successful candidate’. In a telling phrase, Morrison blamed Wilson’s 
selection on ‘local egotisms’, which had ‘failed to subordinate themselves to the wider 
welfare of the party’.74 
Concerns over the wider impact of the campaign prompted a bitter quarrel between 
the local DLP, still loyal to Wilson, and Labour’s Scottish and National executives, who were 
determined that Leith would in future be contested by a candidate capable of articulating the 
party’s national message. Local attempts to have Wilson confirmed as the Labour candidate 
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for future elections were rejected throughout 1927 and 1928.75 Responding to local protests, 
Arthur Henderson retorted that victory in Leith had been ‘thrown away’ by Wilson’s ill-
discipline: the NEC had ‘deferred to the local people in the matter of speakers sent down, 
though they would have preferred others from a National point of view’. The ‘greatest 
blunder’, he concluded, had been local hostility to Benn participating in the campaign; that 
this had been opposed by Labour activists who had spent nearly a decade canvassing against 
Benn was irrelevant. Ben Shaw, Labour’s Scottish secretary, concurred: ‘the National 
Conference’, he stated, ‘laid down the policy of the party’, and, if it was not followed, Labour 
‘would become a mere rabble’.76  
Wilson’s ostracism was such that he was barred from attending Labour’s 1929 
Scottish conference, indicating that local rebelliousness was now indistinguishable from 
Communist disruption.77 To a degree this was rational, since Labour’s opponents used any 
failure to temper aggressive local campaigns as evidence of extremism: as such, discipline, 
consistency and coherence became vital attributes within Labour politics. It was also self-
fulfilling, as the dismissal of local opinion granted credence to Communist accusations that, 
in pursuing national electoral success, Labour had forsaken its working-class and left-wing 
origins. Thus the Communist Workers’ Life cautioned those in Leith that toleration of the 
‘bureaucratic discipline’ of the NEC was ‘handing the Labour movement over to the 
capitalist class’.78 Certainly, local support for the CPGB appeared to increase as a result of 
the dispute: circulars were issued by a joint ‘Left Wing Committee’, and at the 1929 general 
election there were reports of spoiled ballot papers in the constituency that read simply 
‘Communism’.79  
The refusal to endorse Wilson and the campaign against Communist disruption were 
together elements in a wider drive to reform Labour’s political identity, free from local 
traditions of cross-party cooperation, and founded upon loyalty to the national institutions of 
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party. At a meeting with the SEC in 1930 Wilson stated that ‘no candidate … acceptable to 
the Scottish and National executives would be acceptable’ in Leith: the local DLP was 
promptly disaffiliated.80 The defiance in Leith was unusual in its duration and intensity, and 
the constituency was not won for Labour until 1945. But this was a secondary concern: what 
mattered was that Leith had been brought into the mainstream of Labour politics, and would 
be contested by a candidate committed to national Labour policy. There was, after all, little 
value in winning Leith if that victory came at the expense of wider electoral credibility. 
Significantly, this interpretation was shared by the majority of party activists in Edinburgh, 
who did not rally to Wilson’s aid, indicating that a heightened sense of class antipathy was 
only one response to the events of the general strike, and apparently a minority one. Indeed, 
in a measure that was suggestive of the manner in which local opinion was becoming 
increasingly supportive of the leadership’s stance, Edinburgh Trades Council backed the 
reconstitution the party in Leith, assisting with the founding of a new DLP and ensuring that 
affiliated union branches nominated only ‘loyal’ delegates to the reformed body.81  
While the dispute in Leith was not settled until 1930, elsewhere the effects were more 
immediate. Other than the Scottish Universities by-election of April 1927, contested by 
Labour for reasons of prestige and at which the party surrendered its deposit, the next 
electoral test facing the party in Scotland was in Linlithgowshire in March 1928, following 
the death of the Unionist incumbent, James Kidd.82 Labour’s candidate was Manny Shinwell, 
who had represented the constituency between 1922 and 1924, during which time he enjoyed 
a reputation as an ardent member of the ILP left, a legacy of his incarceration after the 
infamous forty-hour strike in Glasgow in January 1919.83 In 1928, Shinwell proved a more 
sedate campaigner; indeed, his Liberal opponent, Douglas Young, accused him of attempting 
to deceive the electorate by now adopting the ‘guise of a very reasonable, non-extreme 
gentleman’, a veneer he attributed to the shock of Labour’s defeat in Leith.84 While correct to 
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highlight the impact of Leith, Young was wrong to doubt the sincerity of Shinwell’s 
moderation: the embracing of an emollient national appeal was not mere cynical politicking, 
but a sincere response to the changes wrought by the mass franchise and the experience of 
office. The Scotsman concluded that Shinwell’s stint as secretary for mines in 1924 had 
‘sobered him, and so far from the electors being promised the millennium … they are being 
rightly warned that nothing of importance could be done for some time’.85 Shinwell later 
corroborated this assessment, recalling that after 1924 he was conscious that Labour had 
become ‘one of the three great political parties of the nation [and] not merely political 
agitators’.86  
The Linlithgowshire by-election was equally notable for the intervention of the 
CPGB, which toyed, ultimately to no end, with opposing Shinwell. Although instigated at the 
behest of the Communist International, the so-called ‘new line’, with its characterization of 
the Labour leadership as a decadent elite, which had traded principle for office, chimed with 
an enduring provincial suspicion of national politics as an irredeemably corrupt 
environment.87 The policy of ‘class against class’, which saw the CPGB attack Labour rather 
than seek affiliation, was, as Andrew Thorpe has noted, especially popular with Communists 
in Scotland and the north of England, who had long suspected their own leadership in London 
of enjoying too cordial relations with the Labour party.88 Yet the sense of exclusion from, and 
frustration with, national politics to which this identity spoke was attenuated by the extension 
of the franchise, and Communist attacks held limited appeal. In truth, they only assisted the 
efforts of the Labour party to distance itself from charges of extremism: Herbert Morrison 
gleefully thanked ‘Moscow … for blowing to the winds at last the Tory fiction that Labour is 
a creature of Communism’.89 As well as failing to grasp the historic importance of the 
franchise for British radicalism, calls in Linlithgowshire for working-class voters to abstain 
rather than vote Labour only confirmed the absence of any affinity between the two parties.90 
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When at one Communist rally it was lamented that Labour would not countenance any action 
‘unless it was done perfectly legally’, it was hard to imagine many Labour figures demurring. 
Labour speakers preferred to emphasize Shinwell’s track record as a ‘capable 
administrator’.91  
The growing gulf between Labour and the Communists, and between the competing 
conceptions of radical politics they promoted, peaked at the North Aberdeen by-election four 
months later. The contest resulted from the death of Frank Rose, Labour MP for the seat since 
1918. Rose had been a divisive member of the PLP: an opponent of strike action, in 1924 he 
was renounced by the Aberdeen Labour movement after siding with the employers during a 
local industrial dispute.92 His critics, who commanded a majority on Aberdeen TLC, 
attempted to persuade the Scottish executive and NEC to replace him with a candidate with 
local support; these efforts were stymied by the AEU, who financed Rose’s candidacy and 
provided an election agent in the constituency.93 At the time of Rose’s death, the TLC’s 
preferred nominee was Fraser Macintosh, an ILP activist elected to Aberdeen town council in 
1919 as a self-professed ‘Bolshevist’.94 After the experience in Leith, however, there was 
little likelihood of such a nominee being endorsed; the nomination went instead to 
Wedgwood Benn. The Unionist press in Aberdeen commended Labour for recognizing that a 
parliamentary candidate should ‘not only be a moderate, but a man of weight, with … a 
national reputation’.95 But the sight of an erstwhile Liberal standing under the Labour banner 
was not universally popular. Bob Cooney, later Communist organizer for north east Scotland, 
was in 1928 an ILP member in Aberdeen. It was Benn’s selection that convinced him to 
support the Communist candidate Aitken Ferguson: for Cooney, Benn simply ‘wasn’t a 
socialist’.96  
The Communist campaign aligned the party with those who had opposed Rose.97 
Ferguson, who relied upon the traditional street-corner meeting to convey his message, 
Contests of vital importance 
21 
 
accused Labour of becoming just another Liberal party.98 Workers’ Life, in an unsubtle 
reference to Benn, complained that Labour had become a haven for ‘a monstrous crew of ex-
colonels, captains, [and] Liberal lawyers’.99 Benn declined to respond to this criticism, 
deriding Communist efforts as ‘vulgar abuse and stupid, personal attacks’ that degraded ‘the 
whole field of our political life’.100 Benn’s distaste for the public traditions of left-wing 
electioneering reflected official Labour policy. A year earlier, The Labour Organiser, organ 
of the party’s election agents, had dismissed challenges to public debate as a ‘favourite 
weapon of the extreme left wing’, and little more than ‘cheap propaganda’: Labour 
candidates were advised to engage only with ‘prominent members of our Tory and Liberal 
opponents’.101 And although Benn made perfunctory attempts to contest the Communist 
claim to speak for the working class, it was clear that his campaign addressed a broader 
segment of the public. He appealed directly to disaffected Liberal voters, contending that 
Labour had inherited ‘all that was best’ in Liberalism, a category which, presumably, 
included himself.102 Intriguingly, Communists too saw class and nation as mutually exclusive 
categories; when Shapurji Saklatvala, Communist MP for Battersea North, declared that 
Labour was ‘not a working-class party … but a national party’, he was saying no more than 
the official Labour campaign.103  
As in Linlithgowshire, Labour welcomed Communist attacks, since they bolstered the 
party’s denials of sectionalism: the Daily Herald’s Aberdeen correspondent rebuked one 
Unionist voter for accusing Labour of ‘class hatred’, countering that it was precisely ‘because 
it will not stand for the doctrine of class-hatred that the Labour party is so bitterly assailed by 
the Communists’.104 Benn held the seat for Labour easily, exposing the limitations of an 
oppositional appeal, although Ferguson did not perform poorly in the context of his party’s 
wider electoral record, gaining 13 per cent of the vote and forcing the Liberal candidate into 
fourth place. Both Labour and Communist commentators interpreted the result positively, 
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with the latter highlighting the support Ferguson had secured in the working-class areas of 
Aberdeen.105 For Labour, Benn’s victory confirmed that future success rested upon 
constructing a political identity capable of appealing to disaffected Liberals, and indicated 
that the electoral rewards of such a course would more than outweigh any votes shed to the 
left. If there were those who felt betrayed by Labour’s rejection of an exclusive class identity, 
and who longed for a return to an oppositional politics, they were outnumbered by those 
willing to accept the new political settlement. In the aftermath of Benn’s victory, those trades 
council delegates who had supported the Communist campaign were expelled.106 Class, trade 
and place were trumped by the national requirements of party, and a focus on issues that 
could transcend class and regional boundaries. 
By 1928 attempts to portray Labour as an extremist force appeared increasingly 
absurd, and the efforts of the NEC to impose a more disciplined ethos on the party’s 
electioneering had been vindicated; the traditions of provincial radicalism were 
correspondingly weakened. Crucially, Communist opposition confirmed Labour’s 
constitutionalism. Contrary to the persistent assumption that Labour’s return to office in 1929 
arose from a rising class consciousness and resentment towards the Conservative 
government’s legislative response to the general strike, a study of Scottish by-elections in this 
period reveals that Labour encouraged, and prospered in, more placid electoral 
atmospheres.107 At the Midlothian and Peeblesshire Northern by-election in January 1929 the 
Labour candidate Andrew Clark faced a four-cornered contest after the Liberals and the 
newly founded National party of Scotland entered the fray. Barring Clark’s prior victory in 
1923, the seat, which encompassed rural farmland, mining villages, and the suburbs of south-
west Edinburgh, had been Unionist since its creation in 1918.108 In such a constituency a 
wider field of candidates assisted Labour, and Clark made sure to follow a moderate path, 
avoiding boisterous rallies or excitable policy declarations; he was, The Times noted, a 
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‘thoroughly orthodox Labour candidate’ who adhered to the ‘safe text’.109 During the 
campaign Hugh Murnin, MP for Stirling and Falkirk Burghs, argued that Labour sought 
power in order to assist the whole ‘community’, and declared optimistically that the time was 
approaching when Labour ‘would be returned with a majority sufficient to manage the affairs 
of the country, not in the interests of a section but in the interests of the nation as a whole’.110 
These efforts to ensure a peaceful and respectable contest were successful: The Scotsman 
reflected that ‘not even the intervention of a Scottish Nationalist’ could prevent the election 
from being ‘one of the quietest and least exciting to have taken place in the constituency’.111 
The Daily Herald, once captivated by street-corner socialism, reported that the contest was 
known as the ‘well-behaved by-election’: unlike in 1924, the audiences, ‘devoid of emotion’, 
listened ‘most attentively’, enabling Labour to secure a hearing ‘even in the middle-class 
areas’.112 Elections were not merely an opportunity for the political voice of the Labour 
movement to be heard, but for the party to engage with the middle classes, and demonstrate 
that the interests of the classes overlapped.  
That such by-elections were now firmly part of a British electoral contest was evident 
in Clark’s refusal to respond to the presence of the National party candidate, the poet and 
journalist Lewis Spence, unlike the Liberal nominee David Keir, who appeared on the ballot 
as the ‘Liberal and Scottish Home Rule’ candidate. Clark rebuffed Spence’s offer to 
withdraw, contingent on his declaring in favour of home rule, replying that his position on the 
matter could be found in Labour’s national manifesto, and that this was, in any case, a minor 
issue.113 Home rule was, it seemed, one more sectional issue that Labour had outgrown, as 
the cynicism towards Westminster politics that had underlain support for the policy was 
eroded by the new franchise. Such indifference was criticized by the veteran radical Robert 
Bontine Cunningham Graham, who complained that Labour’s ‘spiritual home’ was now 
Westminster, where Scottish members simply acted as instructed by their national 
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leadership.114 Even if accurate, such accusations were of little consequence. Clark was 
victorious, securing a majority of almost 1,000 over his Unionist rival; he declined even to 
offer a victory speech after the count.115  
By shedding traditional appeals to class identity and the totemic policies of home rule 
and land reform, and adopting a dispassionate model of electioneering, Labour could, in 
Clark’s words, appear as an ‘effective substitute for the present government’.116 This 
reflected the success of Conservative warnings surrounding the dangers of sectionalism in 
shaping the wider political culture, and the willingness of Labour to modify its campaigning 
in response. The alternative was to court the irrelevance suffered by those who clung to 
divisive or outmoded appeals, be they Nationalist, Communist, or Liberal: for the Glasgow 
Herald, the Liberals, by pandering to home rule, were guilty of adhering to ‘a number of 
ancient shibboleths which have lost their practical importance’.117 Indeed, the fate of 
Liberalism in this period reveals the dangers of failing to adjust to the demands of the new 
political climate; the Scottish Liberal federation enjoyed little authority and lacked a coherent 
strategy, as local branches pursued their own electoral paths.118  
Two months later, at the North Lanarkshire by-election, the broad political contours 
were comparable, despite the more militant reputation of the Labour candidate Jennie Lee. 
The campaign was relatively peaceful, and when Lee and her Liberal opponent Elizabeth 
Mitchell spoke at neighbouring venues, they exchanged pleasantries rather than insults. It was 
noted that ‘moderation’ was the ‘keynote’ of the Labour campaign: the general strike was not 
mentioned, nor were any plans to repeal the Trades Disputes Act.119 The old tenets of 
radicalism were again found in the Liberal election address, which gave prominence to free 
trade, temperance, and home rule.120 Strikingly, Labour inverted the Conservative rhetoric of 
constitutionalism, admonishing instances of Tory rowdyism, and accusing the Unionist 
candidate Lord Scone, an ally of the Scottish Protestant League who had called for Irish 
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immigration into Scotland to be restricted, of seeking to make the election a question of 
religion. Labour similarly criticized the ‘antics’ of the Communists; in the opinion of the 
Daily Herald it was only ‘Tories and Primrose Dames’ who were still surprized that Labour 
opposed such disruptive behaviour.121  
 
IV 
In the wake of Lee’s emphatic victory in North Lanarkshire, where she overturned a Unionist 
majority of some 2,000, the Daily Herald declared that Labour had indisputably ‘captured’ 
the loyalties of ‘industrial Britain’. There was, however, a note of caution: to secure a 
majority, the party needed to focus ‘on the rural and semi-rural areas’, a task which could not 
be entrusted to local activists, but required the use of ‘star’ speakers and central resources.122 
This call for greater national direction was echoed at Labour’s Scottish conference the 
following month, where the executive asked local activists to recognize that: 
  
legislation and administration are beset with immense technical difficulties, 
often not visualised in Branch debates, or at the street corner among 
sympathisers. Sound Socialistic administration … cannot be determined, or 
greatly assisted, by a continuous stream of protests from small sections at a 
distance from the scene of operations, which do not know all the factors.123  
 
The horizons of radicalism expanded considerably between 1924 and 1929, and there was a 
marked distance between the impotent frustration with which the Labour leadership had 
viewed the farce in Kelvingrove, and the resolve with which they faced down local 
recalcitrance in Leith and Aberdeen. And while the intensity of a by-election could not be 
wholly replicated at a general election, the Scottish contests considered here were of lasting 
significance, offering a crucial space in which the readjustment of Labour’s image could 
take place and the party’s nationwide aspirations could be displayed. By 1929 Labour’s 
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socialism was a British vision, one which transcended the boundaries of class, industry and 
place that had previously shaped radical politics. It was also an ethos best administered and 
understood at a national level: put bluntly, hierarchy mattered more than conviction or 
length of service, and the role of local activists was to implement decisions taken by the 
national leadership. Critically, the bulk of Labour members appeared to concur with this 
assessment, seeing in such a disciplined approach their surest route to electoral success. It 
was in this sense that national concerns permeated the locality, as the belief that social and 
political reform could be achieved by means of a parliamentary majority grew, inducing 
local branches to follow the lead offered by their national institutions.  
We should, then, resist the temptation to ascribe the decline of provincial radicalism 
to the impact of the inter-war economic depression.124 While the economic woes of the 
1930s certainly caused politicians from across the political spectrum to place greater faith in 
centralized planning and state intervention, the reshaping of radicalism was a political 
evolution, one rooted in political reform, and, if not complete prior to the collapse of the 
second minority Labour government in 1931, then certainly well underway. In 1929 the 
Scottish executive declared that, despite ‘occasional local difficulties’, it was impressed by 
the ‘increasing sense of responsibility, and profound unity’ of the Labour party. Once again 
the franchise was the dominant factor: ‘organisation, and not dogma’, it concluded, ‘is the 
immediate essential’, since ‘twenty-eight million electors are [soon] to be asked, not whether 
they … belong to the right, the centre, or the left, but whether they are satisfied with the 
government of caretakers for the rich’. The opportunities offered by mass democracy 
guaranteed that victory could be secured via ‘the ballot box by self-sacrificing work under 
the direction of the election agent and his assistants’.125 This was not the voice of a vehicle 
for class loyalty or popular discontent, but that of a party prepared to challenge the 
Conservative claim to represent the interests of the nation. Even if this task proved beyond 
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Labour during the 1930s, we should note that the seminal change in perspective it entailed 
survived the events of 1931 intact.126 The origins of the ‘politics of restraint’ and ‘self-
discipline’ that has been identified as central to Labour politics after 1945 are, then, to be 
found in the experiences of the 1920s.127 Likewise, for all its overweening proclamations of 
novelty, the ‘New’ Labour electoral strategy of the 1990s had long-established roots in the 
history of the Labour party.128  
Crucial was a transformation in perceptions of where politics took place. In 1927 the 
Communist journalist Robin Page Arnot offered a pessimistic prediction of Labour’s future 
prospects. This forecast was based upon on a survey of trades councils and union branches, 
where Arnot found a movement in a state of ‘decay and disruption’: the ‘whole fabric’ of 
Labour politics was, he thought, ‘being steadily undermined’. But the conviction that 
national success depended upon local vigour and enthusiasm proved, in the new political 
climate, incorrect: it was the national ‘façade’ of which Arnot was so dismissive that 
mattered most.129 Labour representatives were no longer sent to parliament to voice the 
discontent of the people, but were vested with an authority that derived from the wider 
electorate and their party’s national programme; in this they were no different from their 
Conservative peers. As the boundaries of the constitution expanded, faith in regional and 
working-class exceptionalism declined. British politics was shaped by the belief that the 
electorate and the parties who hoped to receive their votes were equal participants in a single 
national system capable of accommodating all legitimate interests. For those convinced that 
there was a separate working-class political sphere, incompatible with and antagonistic to 
Westminster politics, this proved a fatal development. British radicalism ceased to be a 
patchwork of provincial or even national identities, but would be expressed, at least until the 
1960s, via a Labour party whose central purpose was to replace the Conservatives at 
Westminster as the party of government. This had far-reaching consequences, as 
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confrontational local political customs gave way to nationally managed campaigns, and the 
rhetoric of radicalism, with its moralistic denunciations of the corrupt nature of national 
politics, was replaced by the more routine, yet, in many respects, more ambitious, claim to 
be better placed to represent a united, democratic, and, as the Scottish by-elections examined 
here suggest, indisputably British, political nation.
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